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Executive Summary

In this report, a fire protection and fire hazard analysis has been performed on a semiconductor facility, abbreviated as the Fab, located on Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque,
New Mexico. The Fab is part of the MESA complex which is operated by the NTESS
corporation for the Department of Energy (DOE) at Sandia National Laboratories.

The prescriptive analysis of this report addresses the various fire protection systems in the
facility such as fire suppression, and fire alarm. The prescriptive analysis is based on national
codes and standards from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and from the
International Code Council (ICC). Specific and unique requirements also stem from Sandia
National Laboratories specifications and from the DOE orders and standards. The
performance based section of this report analyzes two fire scenarios which were selected
based upon current operations in the facility and the possibility (greater than 0%) of both
scenarios occurring. These two fire scenarios compare the same situation with and without
sprinklers. The design fire basis is based on lab coats and other gowning items stored in the
corridor. The concern is that if the lab coats were to catch on fire, the integrity of the corridor
as an egress path might be compromised. Through fire modeling and widely accepted
tenability criteria, it was shown that the concern is valid and that a lab coat fire presents a
significant challenge for the facility.
The results of this report indicate that an exit should be added to the exterior in RM 1919,
the hydraulic calculations for the facility should be reconstituted and the gowning operations
should be moved from the tour aisle into the fabrication area.
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PROJECT BUILDING: SNL Fab Facility
1.0 Introduction

1.1 General Report Description

This report is my culminating project of the California Polytechnic University’s Fire Science Master’s
program. In this report, I will address the prescriptive fire protection requirements of my selected project
building along with fire scenarios I’ve selected for a performance based fire protection analysis. The report
is broken up such that a general introduction will give basic background information on the facility,
followed by the prescriptive requirement analysis, then a performance based analysis and finally a
recommendations and conclusion section.

1.2 General Facility Description

The microelectronics development laboratory (MDL), also called the fabrication facility (Fab), and
numbered by Sandia Laboratories as building 858 North, is part of a complex of buildings designed for
both business occupancy, and semiconductor fabrication. These sets of buildings are collectively known
as the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) complex. Figure 1 shows the layout of
the 858 complex. The Fab is one of the two main areas of semiconductor development in the complex. It
has fabrication areas in its southern section and other support labs and storage areas to the north. It is
physically located to the North of 858 South which has the office space of the complex and 858EF which
also handles semiconductor fabrication (albeit in a different fashion than the Fab). Figure 2 shows a
picture of the exterior of the facility. 858 North aka the Fab is the “inverse T-shaped” space in the NW
part of MESA. All the four facilities of MESA are physically connected but separated from each other by
fire barriers or walls. For example, 858 North is separated from 858EF with a double fire-wall but is
separated from 858 South with only a fire barrier.
858J
858G
858N
(Fab)

858EF
858EL

858S

Figure 1. Main buildings of the MESA complex.
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Figure 2. Northside of B858N, the FAB, near the utility section of the facility.

The 858 complex of buildings is typically called the Microsystems Science and Engineering Complex
(MESA) complex. The MESA complex has a large number of fire hazards including hazardous production
materials (HPMs) which are used for semiconductor manufacturing. 858 North has the actual
semiconductor fabrication area or “fab area” in the southern portion of the facility and the business area
(offices, small labs) in the northern part of the facility. There are also small buildings near 858 which serve
functional purposes such as 858G which is a warehouse and 858J which serves as a facilities equipment
hub for the entire complex.
The MESA complex is operated as a 24 hour, 5-day production facility which means any loss of production
can potentially cost millions of dollars. Because of the large demands on the facility and the cost of
downtime, it’s imperative that building occupants only be evacuated from the facility in case of an actual
emergency. The facility also has a very large concern with any release of hazardous production gases.
Therefore, any fire alarm and communication systems must properly interface with the facility’s warning
system for HPMs. Also, care must be taken to only stop the flow of HPM gases if there is an actual
emergency for the reasons stated above. Even if occupants remain working in the building, if the flow of
HPM gases is interrupted, business would be disrupted at a large cost (both financial and in terms of the
resulting operational downtime).

1.3 Building Location

The facility is located on Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in Albuquerque, New Mexico and is part of the
Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017
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operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Honeywell International Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security
Administration.

1.4 Building Occupants

Building occupants include management and a large staff of workers in the fabrication area. See Figure 3
of a typical worker who might be notified by the facility’s fire alarm system. Because of the nature of the
fabrication process, evacuating workers in general would be more difficult than regular lab or office
employees because of the special clothing they wear and due to a possible need to put materials in a safe
position before exiting a clean room. However, this facility has several different types of alarms including
a fire alarm. For certain alarms, it is expected that the worker fully de-gowns as normal; however, for a
fire alarm, they are to immediately exit from the space they are working in even when fully gowned. This
topic of different facility alarms is further discussed in the fire alarm section of this report.

Figure 3. Picture of a typical worker in the fabrication area.

1.5 Building Layout and Use

The Fab is a two-story building with a basement. See Figures 4 thru 6 for the layout of each floor. The
gross square footage of the building is 72,152 square feet and the net square footage is 70,091 square
feet. The first floor is the main activity floor for the building and contains the semiconductor fabrication
areas, office space, and general labs. In the fabrication area, there are etching labs, micromachining labs,
wafer storage areas, and other similar spaces that one would expect to see in a semiconducting facility.
There are also various chases in the area which house HVAC and similar equipment needed to maintain
the clean room environment of the area. Based on the layout of the building, there is approximately a
chase for every clean room. There is also a gowning area where occupants are expected to put on special
clean room approved clothing, such as a gown and headwear, over their regular, or “street”, clothes. The
semiconductor fabrication area is located on the south end of the facility and is separated from the rest
of the facility by a three-hour rated fire barrier. The south fabrication area is separated from the rest of
the occupancies (storage and business) by a two-hour rated barrier. See Appendix A for a layout of the
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017
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fire barriers throughout the first floor. Appendix A-8 shows the numerous exits on the first floor of the
Fab.

Figure 4. First floor layout. The up arrow represents true North.

Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017

15

Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab)

Figure 5. Second floor layout. Red circles indicate exits.
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Figure 6. Basement layout. Red circles indicate exits.

To the north of the semiconductor fabrication area are the office spaces and general labs. There is also a
loading dock on the west end of the facility. East of the loading dock are general office spaces and east of
that is a cluster of storage rooms where the semiconductor hazardous production materials (HPMs) are
located. There are one-hour fire barriers between the general storage rooms (S occupancy per IBC), office
spaces (B occupancy per IBC), and HPM storage rooms (H-5 occupancy per IBC).
The second floor is generally used for storage and catwalks overlooking the labs. The second-floor storage
rooms are for ordinary storage; that is no hazardous material storage. There is also a shop area on the
second floor. There is no fire rated separation between floors of this facility.
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Overall, there is a lot of construction work currently occurring the building. New egress doors are being
added which will slightly change the means of egress analysis (see Figure 7). Several existing barriers
also had to be adequately fire calked to maintain their rating. The CAD files for this facility and life safety
plans for this building will need to be as-built after this project is complete.

Figure 7. New project in corridor to add door (left) and seal fire barrier penetrations (right)

2 Prescriptive Egress Requirements

This section focuses with how the Fab satisfies prescriptive code requirements from the 2015 IBC and the
2015 LSC. Note that the original code of record for the Fab was the 1985 Uniform Building Code or UBC
which was the precursor for the International Building Code. Code requirements such as allowable travel
distance, dead ends, and occupant loads will be discussed in this section. Specialty codes such as NFPA
318 will also be discussed since semiconductor facilities have unique more restrictive requirements that
go beyond those from the IBC and LSC.

2.1 Occupancy Classifications

The first floor of the Fab is the primary floor of the building and is typically occupied. The second floor is
mostly a catwalk area to overlook the lab and general storage space and is typically unoccupied or
occupied for only short intervals (such as to store/retrieve materials or oversee operations of the labs
below). The basement is for large equipment serving the first floor and is typically unoccupied except for
maintenance performing work. Also since the floor between the first floor and basement is not fire rated,
the basement is considered the same occupancy as the first floor above it. This means that the basement
is the more stringent H-5/industrial occupancy and not the typical classification of a mechanical room
utility space. The IBC does not allow an occupied H-5 floor below grade (IBC section 415). Therefore, no
occupant load is assigned to the basement using NFPA 101. However, if the IBC were to be used for the
basement then the basement would be categorized as a group “U” (miscellaneous) occupancy. Note that
a group U occupancy in the IBC does not require a lot of the fire protection features such as sprinkler
coverage that would be required of an occupied classification (e.g. “B”).
The most important occupancy classification to note in this facility is semiconductor fabrication area which
falls under the H-5 occupancy class (High Hazard – semiconductor) of the 2015 IBC and the IndustrialPrepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017
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General classification of the 2015 LSC. Interestingly while the classification of a semiconductor fabrication
area is clear in the IBC (it has its own category), it is not so for the 2012 LSC. While one might logically
assume that the area would be an industrial use per Table 7.3.1.2, the question becomes which one? Is it
general and high purpose industrial? Is it special purpose industrial? What do those terms really mean?
The answer lies in chapter 40 of the LSC which is the industrial occupancy chapter and also in another
NFPA code, written specifically for a semiconductor fabrication facility. Chapter 40 defines the three
different groups of industrial occupancies. General industrial occupancy is for ordinary and low hazard
occupancy operations. Special purpose occupancies are the same as general industrial ones except that
these are characterized by having a low density of human occupancy; that is the majority of the space is
taken up by machinery and/or equipment. High hazard industrial occupancies differ from the other two
because of their use of high hazard materials.
So then the question becomes which one of these definitions does a semiconductor facility fall under?
One might intuitively think that a semiconductor facility would be a high hazard industrial occupancy
because of the hazard production materials (HPMs) that are used for semiconductor production. These
hazardous materials include silane gas which has a maximum flammability rating of “4” on the NFPA 704
diamond.
However, a semiconducting fabrication area does not fall under the high hazard industrial occupancy
classification if one looks at NFPA 318 (2015 edition), Standard for the Protection of Fabrication Facilities.
Per NFPA 318 paragraph 4.2, “semiconductor manufacturing facilities…shall be considered general-orspecial purpose industrial occupancies as defined in NFPA 101, Life Safety Code.” This is probably since
HPMS are only used sparingly in semiconductor production spaces (usually small cleanrooms) and that
another provision of NFPA 318 specifies that the tools in a clean room shall be constructed of
noncombustible materials or they have to be provided with internal fire detection and suppression.
Note that the southern part of the facility is all marked as a group H-5 (per IBC) or general-industrial
occupancy even though that area includes spaces such as restrooms, and general labs that would normally
be marked as a business occupancy. The reason for this is that there is no fire separation in the entire
southern part of the facility which means that all the area must be considered the same occupancy as the
semiconductor fabrication labs because the required fire separation from either the IBC or LSC is not
present. Also note that the HPM storage rooms to the north of the fabrication area have a high hazards
industrial occupancy classification because the same materials are stored in there that are used in the labs
but in a larger space than the small individual labs which presents more of a fire protection issue. The risk
mitigating fire protection features of the fabrications labs, such as non-combustible tools or an extra fire
suppression system, is also not present in the storage area. The HPM storage areas also have a fire
separation between them and the adjacent business occupancy to the west.
Appendix A contains scanned color-coded markings of each floor plan which represent their occupancy
class. Note that equivalent IBC classifications are noted. Overall it was observed that IBC has more specific
occupancy classifications than the Life Safety Code (LSC). An example is the IBC having 5 hazard categories
(H-1 thru H-5) available for the storage and use of hazardous materials while the LSC doesn’t have specific
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hazard categories. Yet another example is that the IBC has a specific category for miscellaneous and
equipment space while the LSC does not.

2.2 Occupant Loads

Occupant load calculations for both the first and second floor are shown in Table A.1. Most occupants
reside on the first floor. Some occupants reside on the second floor, mainly in a small shop area (see Figure
8). The majority of the second floor is not occupied and taken up by catwalks overlooking the labs. Note
that this is not an atrium since the labs (fabrication areas) are enclosed by ceilings; hence the requirement
for them to be clean rooms. No occupancy analysis was performed on the basement because this space
is only occupied by maintenance or if some construction work is being performed. Even though the
basement is a large space, it is mostly filled with equipment serving the fabrication area. See Figure 9 for
a picture of the basement.

Figure 8. Second floor. Small row of storage areas and a shop at the end.

Figure 9. Basement. Note the large amount of equipment.
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The LSC and IBC are both similar in which factors they use to determine the exit capacity of a means of
egress component such as a door or stair. In the LSC, these factors are called capacitor factors and they
can be found in Table 7.3.3.1. For the Fab, the two types of means of egress components used are the
stairs, which are located in the northern part of the building on the other side of a fire barrier with the
fabrication area, and numerous doors leading to the exterior. There is one exit door that is considered
high hazard, which is the exit door from the HPM storage area. Table 1 shows the exit capacity for the first
and second floors. Note the numerous exits of the facility shown in the appendix Figure A-8. Figure 10
shows an exterior view of the numerous emergency exits on the south wall of the Fab. The red tubes are
fans meant to maintain laminar flow in each clean room. Each one of them has an arrow showing the
direction of egress for an occupant once they reach the exterior.
Table 1. Exit Capacities of the 1st floor of the Fab
NFPA 101 Table
7.3.3.1
1st floor
Door Type
Quantity
Single
Leaf,
Low/Mod
Hazard
Single
Leaf,
High Hazard
Double
Leaf,
Low/Mod
Hazard
Double
Leaf,
High Hazard
Total:

18

Width
(inches)
44

Capacity
Factor Capacity
(Width / Person)
(Persons)
0.2
220

1

44

0.4

110

110

5

88

0.2

440

2200

1

88

0.2

440

440

25

2nd floor
Component
Quantity
Type
Stair
1
*Single
Leaf 1
Door
* door leads to
the stair
Basement
Component
Type
Stair

Quantity
1

Total
Capacity
(persons):
Width
(inches)
44
44

Capacity
Factor
(Width / Person)
0.3
0.2

Capacity
(Persons)
147
220
Total
Capacity
(persons):

Width
(inches)
44
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Capacity
Factor Capacity
(Width / Person)
(Persons)
0.3
147

Each Total Capacity
by Door Type
3960

Exit 6,270

Each Total Capacity
by Door Type
147
220
Exit 147

Each Total Capacity
by Door Type
147
21

Double
Leaf, 1
Low/Mod
Hazard
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IBC
Table
1005.1
1st floor
Door Type
Quantity
Single
Leaf,
Non-H
Occupancy
Single Leaf, H
Occupancy
Double Leaf, H
Occupancy
Total:

88

0.2

440

Total
Capacity
(persons):

440

Exit 587

5

Width
(inches)
44

Capacity
Factor Capacity
(Width / Person)
(Persons)
0.15
293

14

44

0.2

220

3080

6

88

0.2

440

2640

25

2nd floor
Component
Quantity
Type
Stair
(H 1
Occupancy)
Single
Leaf 1
Door (H Occ)

Basement
Component
Quantity
Type
Stair
(H 1
Occupancy)
Double
Leaf, 1
Low/Mod
Hazard (H Occ)

Total
Capacity
(persons):
Width
(inches)
44

Capacity
Factor Capacity
(Width / Person)
(Persons)
0.3
147

44

0.2

220
Total
Capacity
(persons):

Width
(inches)
44

Capacity
Factor Capacity
(Width / Person)
(Persons)
0.3
147

88

0.2
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440
Total
Capacity
(persons):

Each Total Capacity
by Door Type
1467

Exit 4,547

Each Total Capacity
by Door Type
147
220
Exit 147

Each Total Capacity
by Door Type
147
440
Exit 587
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Figure 10. On the left are four emergency exits along the south tour aisle of the Fab.

2.4 Number of exits

The number of exits is another case of identical requirements between the IBC and LSC. Both (LSC
paragraph 7.4.1.2 and IBC section 10.15.1.1 state the following with different verbiage:
•
•
•

For an occupant load between 500 and 1,000 two exits are required.
For an occupant load more than 1,000 four exits are required.
For an occupant load less than 500 two exits are required (unless some other special
conditions are met.

Per the 2016 version of the IBC, 3 exits are required per story for an occupant load between 500 and
1,000. Based on the number of exits for the first floor (21 total), adequate exit capacity is easily provided
for the facility. The second floor also meets the exit requirements of the LSC because paragraph 42.2.4.1
which allows for a single exit for ordinary hazard storage occupancies which overall the second floor would
be classified as.

2.5 Arrangement of the Means of Egress

The Fab has numerous exits along its perimeter. See Figure A-8 for the location of exits on the first floor
and Figures 5 and 6 for the stair locations on the second floor and basement respectively. These exits are
emergency exits only and not to be used for occupants leaving the space regularly. See Figure 11 below.
Once occupants exit from these doors then they can look at arrows on the red fan tubes leading into the
facility. They also have numerous exit signs hanging in the middle of the corridor to look at. There are also
some doors which appear that they might be an exit but are not. These doors are properly marked “no
exit”.
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Figure 11. Emergency Exit Door of the Fab along South Tour Aisle

The exit paths are clear of obstructions except for the stairs leading down from the basement which have
a small personnel gate. See Figure 12. This gate self-latches and an occupant exiting from the basement
to the first floor pushes this gate. While this gate is not marked with a “no exit” sign, a reasonable
occupant would not be led to believe that they could exit by going down to the basement. Therefore, this
gate is not a concern from an egress standpoint.

Figure 12. Gate leading from the first floor to the basement in the stairwell.

There are special egress requirements for the HPM storage rooms since they have high hazard content.
The LSC paragraph 7.11.4 requires two means of egress for these spaces unless ALL of the following criteria
are met:
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Rooms or spaces do not exceed 200𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 .
Rooms or spaces have an occupant load not exceeding three persons
Rooms or spaces have a travel distance to the room door not exceeding 25 feet.

In the case of the cluster of HPM storage rooms (rms. 1946, 1950, 1958, and 1964) each one has an area
greater than 200𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 . Therefore, all four of these rooms are required to have two exits and each one does;
thus, all the arrangements of egress requirements for the chemical storage area are met. However, there
is the acid scrubber room in the NW portion of the facility which does not meet these requirements even
though it is a high hazard area. Therefore, the Fab does not meet all the provisions of NFPA 101.

2.5.1 Remoteness of Exits

The LSC has criteria meant to prevent two exits from being located too close to each other. The reasoning
is that if the exits are too close together, a single fire event could result in the loss of both exits. Paragraph
7.5.1.3 of the 2012 LSC states, “Remoteness shall be provided in accordance with 4.5.1.3.1 through
7.5.1.3.7.” Because the Fab is sprinklered, that leads to LSC paragraph 7.5.1.3.3. which states, “In buildings
protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic sprinkler system in accordance with Section
9.7, the minimum separation distance between two exits, exit accesses, or exit discharges, measured in
accordance with 7.5.1.3.2, shall be not less than one-third the length of the maximum overall diagonal
dimension of the building or area being served.”
This criterion is easily met by the exits on the southern part of the facility. However, if it is assumed that
the equipment space in the northern half of the facility is occupied, then some of the exits do not meet
the remoteness criteria (see Figure 13). However, there are sufficient exits for the space even if some of
the doors are eliminated because they are too close to each other. See Table 2 for egress analysis of the
utility space. A 113-occupant load requires more than two exits (occupant load more than 49). However,
there are five for the space and at least two of them meet the remoteness criterion so remoteness is not
an issue for this space either.
Note that room 1922 was not considered to be occupied in the egress analysis because it is dedicated
equipment space. However, if it was considered fully occupied, it is not expected to factor into the egress
analysis of the rest of the building because of the fact the space has two walls exposed to the exterior of
the building. And another possible exit path through the adjacent general lab which does not pose a higher
hazard than room 1922 (thus being allowed as an egress path for room 1922 occupants.)
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Figure 13. Remoteness criteria in the north equipment room.

Table 2. Occupant Load of Room 1922 (Equipment):
Occupancy Classification

Occupant Load Factor

Area (Square Footage)

Occupants

Industrial, General

100

11373

113.73

2.5.2 Dead-Ends

Figure 14 shows the dead ends of the Fab. Per LSC paragraph 38.2.5.2.1 in business occupancies protected
by an automatic sprinkler system, dead end corridors shall not exceed 50’. The corridor in the northern
business occupancy end of the building measures at 49’ which is just at the limit allowable. The second
dead end path is in the industrial, general use occupancy (the semiconductor fabrication area). It
measures in at 31.5’. Table 40.2.5 of the LSC allows for a 50’ dead end corridor since the space is sprinkler
protected so that code criteria are met.
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Figure 14. Dead end corridors on the first floor of the Fab.

2.5.3 Common Path of Travel

The maximum common path of travel is 100 feet for a business occupancy with a sprinkler system (LSC
38.2.5.3.1. The maximum common path of travel is 100 feet for a general industrial occupancy with a
sprinkler system. In both occupancy cases, the maximum common path of travel is not exceeded. The
same is true for the storage spaces on the second floor which have a maximum common path of travel of
100 feet for an ordinary hazard storage occupancy.

2.5.4 Travel Distance

The maximum allowable travel distance requirement from an H-5 occupancy is 200 feet while the
requirement for a business occupancy with sprinkler protection is 300 feet (per IBC, Table 1016.2). The
travel distance requirements from the LSC are 250 feet for general industrial occupancy protected by a
sprinkler system (per Table 40.2.6) and 300 feet in the business occupancy since it is sprinkler protected.
When either code criteria are used (LSC or IBC), the travel distance requirement is met.
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2.6 Horizontal exits

There are no horizontal exits in the Fab. There is a two-hour complete fire separation between the north
and south ends but neither side meets all the requirements of the LSC paragraph 7.2.4.

2.7 Fire Barriers and Enclosures

See Figure A-1 for the location of fire barriers. Overall, there is a 2-hour barrier around the corridor
separating the southern fabrication area from the rest of the facility. There is also a 4-hour rated wall
separating 858N from 858EF. The 4-hour rated barrier is accomplished by two 3 hour rated doors. To the
south there is a fire-resistant glass (Fire-Lite door) which has a 90-minute rating and separates 858N from
858S. 858S has a combination of labs and offices. See Figure 15 for a picture of this door.

Figure 15. 90-minute fire rated door separating 858N and 858S.

Elsewhere around the facility there is a 2-hour fire rated barrier separating the HPM storage rooms with
the utility/equipment space to the north and the business occupancy cluster of buildings to the west. The
business cluster of offices is also separated by a two-hour rated wall with the utility space to its north.

2.8 Exit signs

Requirements to properly post exit signs are included in both the IBC and LSC. IBC paragraph 1006.1
states, “The means of egress, including the exit discharge, shall be illuminated at all times the building
space served by the means of egress is occupied.” (The exceptions that follow below this paragraph do
not apply to the Fab.) IBC paragraph 1011.1 also states, “Exits and exit access doors shall be marked by
an approved exit sign readily visible from any direction of egress travel. The path of egress travel to exits
and within exits shall be marked by readily visible exit signs to clearly indicate the direction of egress travel
in cases where the exit or the path of egress travel is not immediately visible to the occupants. Intervening
means of egress doors within exits shall be marked by exit signs. Exit sign placement shall be such that no
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point in an exit access corridor or exit passageway is more than 100 feet or the listed viewing distance for
the sign, whichever is less, from the nearest visible exit sign.” (The exceptions that follow below this
paragraph do not apply to the Fab.) Paragraph 1011.3 of the IBC goes on to further give the requirements
for illumination of the exit signs, whether internally or externally illuminated.
The LSC gives a basic requirement of marking the means of egress as well as it states in paragraph
7.10.1.2.1, “Exits, other than main exterior exit doors that obviously and clearly are identifiable as exits,
shall be marked by an approved sign that is readily visible from any direction of exit access.” Paragraph
7.10 goes on to give even more specific requirements on the illumination and marking of exits. These
requirements include the size of the text “No Exit” (that should be placed on doors which could be
mistaken as leading to an exit) and the visual characterization requirements that a special sign (non-exit
sign) needs to follow.
In the Fab, exit marking is adequate. Figure 16 shows a typical exit sign on the first floor which is properly
illuminated and clearly shows the direction of the exit (the left arrow on the sign). The basement also has
egress path markings on the floor which help maintenance personnel because of the large size of the
basement and the aisles formed from the large equipment spaces (see Figure 17). Figure A-7 shows the
proposed exit signs in the first floor if they ever need to be reconstituted.

Figure 16. Example of a typical exit sign on the first floor of the Fab.
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Figure 17. Example of an exit path marking on the floor of the Fab basement.

2.9 Interior Finishes

Because the Fab is a production type facility and not a typical SNL research facility, the number of posters,
pictures, displays, etc. that might lead to interior finish issues with the LSC and IBC are not present in this
facility like other SNL buildings. (858S has the majority of posters and displays of the SNL MESA complex
achievements). Interior finish classifications are shared between the IBC and LSC. They are shown below.
Class

A:

=

Flame

spread

index

0-25;

smoke-developed

index

0-450.

Class

B:

=

Flame

spread

index

26-75;

smoke-developed

index

0-450.

Class

C:

=

Flame

spread

index

76-200;

smoke-developed

index

0-450.

The interior finish requirements are given in the LSC chapter 10 and the IBC in chapter 8. Table 803.9 of
the IBC gives the requirements based on occupancy type. See Table 3 below. The occupancy groups in the
FAB are marked in red text.
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Table 3. Interior Finish Requirements from the IBC. (Abbreviated for the sake of brevity.)

GROUP
SPRINKLEREDl
(OCCUPANCY) Interior
Corridors
exit
stairways
A-1 & A-2
B
B
f
A-3 , A-4, A-5
B
B
B, E, M, R-1
B
C
R-4
B
C
F
C
C
H
B
B
I-1
B
C
I-2
B
B
I-3
A
Aj
I-4
B
B
R-2
C
C
R-3
C
C
S
C
C
U
No restrictions

Rooms

C
C
C
C
C
Cg
C
Bh, i
C
Bh, i
C
C
C

NONSPRINKLERED
Interior exit Corridors
stairways
A
Ad
A
Ad
A
B
A
B
B
C
A
A
A
B
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
C
C
B
B
No restrictions

Rooms
Be
C
C
B
C
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C

Table A.10.2.2 of the LSC (in the annex but assembled from the enforceable parts of the code in the main
section) similarly gives requirements for interior finishes based on occupancy classification as shown in
Appendix A.
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Table 4. Interior Finish Requirements from the Life Safety Code.

All interior finish requirements are met currently in the Fab.
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2.10 Prescriptive Requirement Summary

In summary, the Fab presents unique egress challenges because of its high hazard contents (per the LSC),
the fact that it is a semiconductor facility (see NFPA 318), and because it’s an H-5 occupancy (per the IBC).
Also, because there are no true fire barriers between floors both the interstitial second floor as well as
the basement are considered H-5 occupancies which means they also need to meet egress requirements
for an H-5. Almost all egress requirements are met except for RM 1919 which does not meet requirements
for a high hazard area. A second door may be added to the exterior to eliminate this deficiency as
discussed in the conclusions and recommendations section of this report. Let’s now shift our discussion
to the fire alarm systems of this facility.

3 Fire Alarm and Communication Systems
3.1 General Description

The fire alarm system in the FAB is a Honeywell Notifier fire alarm system. One fire alarm system is used
for the entire 858 (MESA) complex. One of the reasons for installing one networked system in the entire
facility is due to the unique nature of the MESA complex (several facilities physically connected) and
because of the difficulties of evacuating people from the facility. The MESA complex is one of the few
places on the Sandia New Mexico complex that has a Notifier system. Any repairs on the system need a
special contractor authorized to work on a Notifier system.
There are two main panels for the Fab. One is located on the 1st floor (as pictured in Figure 18) and one is
in the basement (as pictured in Figure 19). The fire alarm system is also tied into several special smoke
detection, suppression, and toxic gas shut down systems as outlined below:
•
•
•
•

Carbon dioxide suppression system for fabrication cleanrooms (Figure 20)
Fire cycle suppression system for chemical dispensing room (Figure 21)
Ultra-sensitive smoke detection (USSD) for sub fab spaces (below the floor) in cleanrooms (Figure
22)
Toxic gas shutdown monitoring and shutdown equipment (Figure 23)
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Figure 18. Picture of Notifier NFS-640 FACP (Nodes 1-2)

Figure 19. Picture of Notifier NFS-640 FACP (Node 3)
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Figure 20. Picture of Notifier 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2 suppression control panel

Figure 21. Viking Fire Cycle suppression release panel
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Figure 22. Analaser USSD panels

Figure 23. Toxic Gas monitoring and shutoff equipment

3.2 Location

The main fire alarm control panel for the MESA complex is in 858EL which is located to the northeast of
858 North. All alarm signals across the MESA complex are directed to this panel which has a radio
transponder that transmits out all signals to Sandia’s proprietary receiving system which then transmits
to the Kirtland AFB Fire Department for response. There are two fire alarm control panels in the FAB
specifically for that facility which is shown below. They are located on the first floor and in the basement.
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These FACPs transmits signals to the panel in 858EL. various specialty suppression and detection system
panels on the first-floor tie into the main fire alarm system. Figure 24 shows a plan view of the main fire
alarm system panel.

Figure 24. FACP location shown by the red circle

3.3 Operating Characteristics

The main reason for having a fire alarm control panel (FACP) in each of the four facilities in the MESA
complex is to only evacuate occupants in the facility that has an alarm. For example, if there were an
alarm in the FAB, 858 North, the FACP would only activate speakers and strobes that are in the FAB.
Currently all facilities use a recorded fire alarm message, which plays through the speakers, to let
personnel know to evacuate. The occupants of the attached facilities (858S, 858EL, and 858EF) would
not even know about the alarm in 858N. The signal from the FAB would go to the transponder in 858EL
which would then be sent to Sandia’s propriety receiving station, The Phoenix, and then go to the
Kirtland Air Force Base fire department for response. Recall that the Sandia New Mexico complex is
located on Kirtland Air Force Base.
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Due to the nature of semi-conductor work, there are many sub-panels that the FACP at 858N ties into.
These include USSD piping in the cleanrooms (which gives local alarms only at the least sensitive levels),
a specialty system that uses heat detectors to cycle the sprinklers on/off, and
CO2 suppression for the tools in the cleanroom. Specialty toxic gas shutdown equipment is also connected
to the fire alarm system and will slowly turn off the flow of toxic gases in the cleanroom upon receipt of
any general alarm signal.

3.4 Fire Detection Devices
3.4.1 Types of Devices

There are multiple fire detection devices located throughout the Fab. Table 5 gives a summary of them
along with pictures where available. All fire alarm initiating devices are of the Notifier type to be
compatible with the Notifier fire alarm control panel in 858N and the entire Notifier fire alarm network at
the B858 (MESA) complex. Multiple modules are used in B858 to tie in signals from the specialty gas
equipment in the facility. For example, a toxic gas alarm or hydrogen gas alarm is tied to the fire alarm
system to issue a general fire alarm in the facility. Because the fire alarm system is an intelligent system
with speakers (and not horns), emergency response is able to issue any specialty message they deem
appropriate across not only 858N but also the other facilities in the 858 complex (858EL, 858EF, and 858
S).
The interaction between the gas detection and alarm equipment and fire alarm system is a key operational
characteristic of the Fab and the MESA complex. There is a control room in the Fab where the toxic gas
system can be managed by emergency personnel as far as which areas they would like to alert to a specific
alarm condition. There are yellow (warning) and red (evacuation) beacons that this system uses in the
FAB. These notification appliances are separate from the fire alarm system. Figure 25 shows the multiple
pull stations available to an emergency manager to pull based on what event was occurring in the building.

Figure 25. Multiple pull stations tied to the toxic gas detection and fire alarm systems.
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Table 5. Initiating Devices present in the Fab.

Type of Device
Heat Detector
(Activate Suppression
System)

Manufacturer Brand
NOTIFIER, Model FST851, mounted on
standard detector
base B710LP

Description
Used to initiate the
Fire Cycle Suppression
system (Fixed temp
type: 135℉

Pull Station

NOTIFIER, Model NBG12LX, dual-action
addressable pull
station

Used as a manual
actuated alarminitiating device

Ultra - Sensitive
Smoke Detection
System (with multiple
panels)
Duct smoke detector

Analaser type

Used to detect smoke
in the sub-Fab areas
of the FAB (under
floor).
Located in air handling
equipment where
required by NFPA 90A

Spot type smoke
detector

XP10-M

FMM-1

NOTIFIER, Intelligent
InnovairFlex Duct
Smoke Detector
Housing Model DNR
with FSP-851
photoelectric smoke
detector
NOTIFIER Honeywell
Fsp-851 Fire Alarm
Intelligent
Photoelectric Smoke
Detector Sensor
NOTIFIER Monitor
Module

NOTIFER Monitor
Module
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Picture (typical)

See Figure 23.

(Housing
above.)

only

shown

In elevator shafts and
in high hazard
chemical storage areas
Connected to multiple
zoned water flow
alarms and hazardous
gas flow alarms and
signals from 858G
(Warehouse)
Connected to spec gas
panel (Trouble and
Alarm Signals) and the
858N CO2 system
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3.4.2 Location, Spacing and Placement of Devices

As mentioned in section 4.5.1, there are a wide variety of initiating devices throughout Fab. Their location
is tied to their purpose. For example, an ultra-sensitive smoke detection system is only needed in the
under-floor area of the fab areas because that’s the only space that requires that sensitive of smoke
detection (to ensure the clean room doesn’t have any contamination on the fabricated product.) The
reason that USSD is in the sub floor spaces of the cleanroom (opposed to above the ceiling) is that in the
Fab cleanroom design the sub fab space is used as a return air plenum since air is directed upward into
the fab areas from below and then goes through HEP filters in the ceiling before being directed back down
towards the sub fab space.
In a similar fashion, the reason for the heat detectors to be in the chemical dispensing rooms is to
activate/deactivate the fire cycle system. A fire cycle system was installed in these rooms since it would
be hazardous if the room becomes flooded with a mix of the chemical and water from a sprinkler
operating. Therefore, the activation temperature of the heat detector is lower than that of the sprinklers
in the room. This design allows for the water flow solenoid to be energized.
All code provisions of where an initiating device is required, has been complied with. See below for a list
of requirements (not meant to an exhaustive list, only a representative one):
•

•

•

•

•

•

IBC 2015 Section 404.4 – Fire Alarm System. A fire alarm system shall be provided in accordance
with Section 907.2.14. The Fab meets this requirement. A fire alarm system which is required by
having a high hazard facility has been provided.
IBC 2015 Section 907.4.1 – Protection of Fire Alarm Control Unit. In areas not continuously
occupied, a single smoke detector shall be provided at the location of each fire alarm control unit,
notification appliance circuit power extenders, and supervising station transmitting equipment.
The Fab meets this requirement. A smoke detector is provided in each one of these areas. (NOTE:
Duct smoke detectors are also provided where required by NFPA 90A.)
IBC 2012 Section 907.4.2.1 – Location. Manual fire alarm boxes shall be located not more than 5
feet from the entrance to the exit. The Fab meets this requirement. The FAB has 32 pull stations
in the locations required. (Note that NFPA 101 9.6.2.3 has the same requirement.)
NFPA 101 Paragraph 9.6.2.5 – Additional fire alarm boxes shall be located so that, on any given
floor in any part of the building, no horizontal distance on that floor exceeding 200 ft shall need
to be traversed to reach a manual fire alarm box. The Fab meets this requirement upon review.
NFPA 101 Paragraph 9.6.2.8 – Where a sprinkler system is provided where there is a fire alarm
system, it shall be provided with an approved alarm initiation device that operates when the flow
of water is equal or greater than that form a single automatic sprinkler. Each of the three Risers
in the Fab have water flow switches with monitor modules which are connected to the fire alarm
system. Upon any water flow condition, the fire alarm system sounds a general fire alarm
throughout the facility.
NFPA 72 Chapter 18 spacing requirements for smoke and heat detectors: The Fab meets code.
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3.5 Analysis of Fire Detector Response
3.5.1 Fire Scenario

The chosen fire scenario for this report is one that has been a pressing concern for the fire protection
engineering department for quite some time. It involves a solvent waste capture system in the
basement where users empty out a barrel of full solvent waste (byproducts from the semiconductor
fabrication process) and replace it with an empty one. The concern is that in the past the users have
left the drum exposed in the basement for days at a time. The sprinkler system in the basement is not
designed to fight such a fire involving solvent waste as a fuel. There are also contradicting positions
between codes on whether or not the flammable liquids are allowed to be stored below grade (in a
basement). A rapidly progressing fire in the basement could also have enormous effects on the first
floor since the first floor is not fire separated from the basement. Figure 26 shows the location of
where the fire would start in the chosen scenario and Figure 27 shows a picture of the actual solvent
waste capture system itself. Note that there are two solvent waste capture systems in the basement
but only one was used in this scenario.

Figure 26. Location of fire in east corridor of the basement
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Figure 27. Solvent waste capture system.

3.5.2 Fire Analysis

The fire occurs in the basement. The basement has a height of approximately 30 feet where sprinklers
are located (per NFPA 13 they are within 1’ of the bottom of the first-floor slab). Sprinklers are placed
approximately 15’ apart in accordance with NFPA 13 requirements. Fast response ordinary
temperature sprinkler heads are used throughout the basement. A fire involving a bucket of solvent
waste is considered ultrafast. Table 6 shows the DETACT model’s parameters.
Table 6. Input parameters used in the DETACT model for the fire analysis.
INPUT PARAMETERS
Ceiling Height (H)
Radial Distance (r)
Ambient Temperature (To)
Activation Temperature (Td)
Response Time Index (RTI)
Fire Growth Power (n)
Fire Growth Coefficient (α)
Time Step
Justification for the selected parameters is below:
•
•
•
•
•
•

9.14
3.2
25
73.9
110
2
0.1876
1

m
m
℃
℃

(m-s)1/2

-

kW/s^n

s

Ceiling height is 30’ or 9.1 m
Maximum radial distance of the sprinkler is 15’ *0.7 = 10.5 ft = 3.2 m
An ambient temperature of 25 ℃ was used based on data from the Nuclear Regultaory
Commission
The RTI used is 50 based on data from the manufacture’s cut sheet.
The sprinkler activation time used is 165 ℉ or 73.9 ℃ .
The fire growth coefficient used was for a “ultrafast” fire.
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The equations given in Figure 28 were used in the DETACT model. The DETACT model results are shown
in Figure 29.

Figure 28. Equations from FPE 522 that were used in the DETACT model.
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Figure 29. Output of the DETACT model showing activation at ~ 150 seconds

As Figure 33 shows, the temperature inside the detector lags that of the gas temperature surrounding the
detector. If the RTI was higher (over 50), then the sprinkler would be called a standard response sprinkler
and the delay between the gas temperature and detector temperature reaching the activation
temperature (as shown as the red line) would be more pronounced. 150 seconds, or a little under two
minutes, is a quick activation time. However, the 5 MW heat release is very troubling given that
maintenance workers could be in the basement and two minutes is not a lot of time to get out of the
intimate fire area. More troubling is that if there were some type of failure with the sprinkler system,
there is no fire rating to the first floor which has a lot more personnel and hazards than the basement.
Based on the severity of the fire from the DETACT model, it is imperative that open drums of solvent waste
never be left out for any period. The DETACT model ran did not give any indication, nor should it have, of
when or if the fire would have been controlled by the nearby sprinklers. Given the expected ultra-fast
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development of the fire, it’s likely the sprinkler system could not provide the necessary control to stop
the fire from spreading out of control. Luckily, Sandia fire protection engineering has worked closely with
the occupants in the FAB who own the solvent waste system to put administrative controls in place to
never leave barrels of waste in the open.

3.6 Fire Alarm Transmission
3.6.1 Fire Alarm System Type

The fire alarm system at the Fab communicates to a proprietary supervising station at Sandia
National Laboratories. The reason this station, called The Phoenix, is this type is that it is monitored
by Sandia emergency operations, maintenance and fire protection engineering all of who have a
financial stake, from a company perspective in the protected property. The central station is
monitored by a workstation in Sandia’s maintenance building. The manager of the Fire Protection
maintenance department also has a monitor in his office that he watches throughout the day. Finally,
the Kirtland Air Force Department receives the signals from The Phoenix at their Honeywell central
receiving station.

3.6.2 Disposition of Signals

If an alarm is received at the Fab or any other Sandia building, then the Kirtland Air Force Base Fire
Department will respond to the building and extinguish the fire as appropriate. If a trouble is received
at the supervising station, then the fire protection maintenance manager will dispatch personnel to
troubleshoot the system. If a supervisory signal is received then Sandia emergency operations will
investigate and contact Sandia facilities if need-be. In the event of a non-fire alarm at the Fab, key
management personnel will also be notified and coordinated with to avoid shutting down production
or evacuating personnel if need-be. Of course, safety takes precedence, but as with any
semiconductor fabrication downtime in the facility has an enormous effect on the mission and a
variety of stakeholders.

3.7 Alarm Notification Appliances
3.7.1 Types of Appliances

The standard notification appliance located throughout the Fab is a System Sensor SpectrAlert SP2 series
wall speaker/multi-candela setting strobe appliances. There are variations to this notification appliance
depending on where it’s located. In the clean rooms audible only devices are installed as not to interfere
with the manufacturing process (which a strobe would do with its “harsh” light). There are a couple strobe
only devices located in the facility. These are in a hallway. It is not clear why these devices have no audio
component for them since even the NAs in the restrooms have speakers. Speaker strobes are installed
throughout the tour aisles (where occupants pass before and after they enter the clean room), mechanical
rooms, conference rooms, basement, and 2nd floor. There are no strobes or speakers in individual offices
or storage rooms.
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Figure 30. Standard notification appliance (speaker/strobe type) located throughout the facility.

3.7.2 Location, Spacing, and Placement of Appliances

Most of the occupied areas of the facility have coverage with a notification appliance. NFPA 72 makes
it clear that it doesn’t dictate exactly where an appliance is located for audible and visual notification
purposes. See the relevant excerpts below from NFPA 72:
•

•

•

•
•
•

18.4.1.4.1 The designer of the audible notification system shall identify the rooms and spaces
that will have audible notification and those where audible notification will not be provided.
18.4.1.4.2 Unless otherwise specified or required by other sections of this Code, the required
coverage area for visible occupant notification shall be as required by other governing laws,
code, or standards. Where the other governing laws, codes, or standards require audible
occupant notification for all or part of an area or space, coverage shall only be required in
occupiable areas as defined in 3.3.178
18.4.1.4.3 The sound pressure levels that must be produced by the audible appliances in the
coverage areas to meet the requirements of this Code shall be documented by the system
designer during the planning and design of the notification system. The greater of the
expected maximum sound pressure level having a duration of at least 60 seconds shall also
be documented for the coverage area by the system designer to ensure compliance with
18.4.3,18.4.4,18.4.5, or 18.4.6 for the coverage area.
3.3.178 Occupiable Area. An area of a facility occupied by people on a regular basis.
18.5.2.1 The designer of the visible notification system shall document the rooms and spaces
that will have visible notification and those where visible notification will not be provided.
18.5.2.2 Unless otherwise specified or required by other sections of this Code, the required
coverage area for visible occupant notification shall be as required by other governing laws,
code, or standards.

Based on the review of the fire alarm drawings, the Fab is code compliant with the location of
notification appliances. Sandia National Laboratories does not require individual audible or visual
notification appliances in individual offices. It also does not require them in storage rooms. Sandia
does require notification appliances (both visual and audible) in conference rooms and Figure 31
shows that it is provided for in the Fab. Acceptance testing was performed for the facility. It was
documented that the sound pressure levels of the appliances did not exceed 110 dbA (per NFPA 72
18.4.1.2) and that they were 15dbA higher than commonly accepted values of ambient noise levels
throughout the facility (for business space, lab space, etc.). NFPA 72 paragraphs 18.4.8.1, 18.5.5.1,
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and 18.5.5.2 cover the mounting installation requirements for notification appliances. One of these
key requirements is to install wall mounted notification appliances such that entire lens is not less
than 80 in. and not greater than 96 in. above the finished floor. The Fab has a fire protection
assessment every three years (which will become an annual assessment in the near future) and there
are no open findings for any deficiencies related to the fire alarm design and installation.

Figure 31. Example of Notification Appliance layout in the office area.

3.8 Emergency Communication Systems (ECS)
3.8.1 Type of ECS

The FAB has a combined fire alarm and emergency communications system. Since the notification
appliances use speakers instead of horns, recorded or live voice messages can be broadcast
throughout the facility. Each of the main fire alarm panels throughout the MESA complex also are
combined FA/ECS panels and each have a microphone that can be used to send messages through
the fire alarm speakers. Figure 32 shows the location of the microphone provided in the main fire
alarm control panel for the Fab. Having an emergency communications system is not standard for
Sandia National Laboratories but the MESA complex has one due to the unique hazards present and
increased need to give specific instructions to personnel based on the location and type of emergency.
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Figure 32. Combined FA/ECS panel. Note the microphone for emergency communications.

3.8.2 Operating Characteristics and Capabilities

Unlike the mass notification systems required by the Department of Defense (see UFC 4-021-01), the
ECS at the Fab is not intended to be operated by building occupants. There are no local operating
consoles (remote microphone stations) provided in the Fab that are required in DoD facilities. The
only operators of the system at the FAB should be designated Sandia Emergency Response personnel
or the Kirtland Fire Department (KFD) although the KFD would probably defer to Sandia’s EOC to
operate the system and make an announcement. The only pre-recorded message for the system
currently is the fire alarm message although this system has the capability for 32 minutes of standard
quality (4 minutes at high quality) digital audio. Specific emergency response plans have been made
for the Fab which likely include scenarios where the ECS would be operated.
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3.9 Power Requirements

3.9.1 Secondary Power Type

Secondary power is provided for the Fab fire alarm system via batteries located underneath the
panel. Batteries are also provided for the CO2 system releasing panel and the Fire Cycle system
control panel. The design of the batteries follows the requirements in NFPA 72 paragraph 10.6.7.2.1
which states the secondary power supply must have the power capacity for 24 hours of standby
operation and 5 minutes of operation in alarm mode. Sandia does not require a more stringent
requirement (like the 72 hours of standby time required for DoD facilities). Sandia uses lead-acid
batteries and has the batteries routinely changed out by the fire alarm maintenance crew if the
battery is more than 4 years old.

3.9.2 Adequacy of Secondary Power

By looking at the fire alarm system database, I was able to determine the quantity of devices and
NACs in the Fab. I was then able to look at manufacturer cut sheets to determine the required
secondary power capacity. Using the requirements of NFPA 72 10.6.7.2.1, I determined the required
amp-hours of the secondary power supply is approximately 16.5. The provided secondary supply
capacity for the Fab fire alarm system is 25 A-H so the secondary power is adequate. Table 7 shows
the results of the calculations.
Table 7. Secondary Power Calculations

Item

Standby
Current
per Unit
(A)

Number
of Units

Total
Standby
Current

Alarm
Current
per Unit
(A)

Number
of Units

Total
Alarm
Current

FACU
Smoke
Detectors

0.189
0.000045

X
X

1
30

0.189
0.00135

0.231
0.018

X
X

1
30

0.231
0.54

Pull
Stations

0.00025

X

32

0.008

0.0004

X

32

0.0128

NAC #1

0.043

X

1

0.043

0.135

X

1

0.135

NAC #2
NAC #3

0.043
0.043

X
X

1
1

0.043
0.043

0.135
0.135

X
X

1
1

0.135
0.135

Heat
Detectors

0.000045

X

3

0.000135

0.018

X

3

0.054

Monitor
Modules

0.000045

X

45

0.002025

0.000045 X

45

0.002025

Control
Modules

0.001

X

50

0.05

0.001

50

0.05
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Duct
Smoke
Detecors
Relays

0.000045

X

9

0.000405

0.018

0.000045

X

Time
factor
(hours)

Standby
Current
(Ahs)

0.189
0.568915
Time
factor
(hours)

0.000045 X

Standby
Current
(Amps)

26
SUM:
Alarm
Current
(Amps)

0.568915

24

13.65396

1.457995 0.08

X

9

0.162
0.00117
1.457995
Required
AH batt.
16.53

Alarm
Current
(Ahs)

Total
Current
(Ahs)

26
SUM:
Safety
Factor
(20%)

0.12

13.78

2.76

3.10 Fire Alarm Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance (ITM)
3.10.1 Inspection and Testing

Sandia has their own in-house fire protection maintenance crew. This crew is divided up into three
crafts: fire sprinkler, fire alarm, and fire extinguisher. The fire alarm crew handles all inspection,
testing, and maintenance (ITM) for Sandia’s fire alarm systems. Sandia building occupants can submit
service requests for anything they notice wrong on the system. For example, a blocked strobe or
audible warning not loud enough during a fire drill. In this fashion, the occupants are the daily basic
inspection check for the system. For testing, each fire alarm system is commissioned in conjunction
with the fire protection engineering department to ensure the systems meet code and function as
designed before being accepted. For testing as part of maintenance requirements, please see the next
section.

3.10.2 Preventive Maintenance

The Sandia fire alarm maintenance team performs a yearly preventive maintenance (PM) on each
building that has a fire alarm system. This PM checklist has been made by fire protection engineering
to incorporate all the ITM requirements from NFPA 72. Once completed these PMs then go to a Sandia
fire protection engineer for review. If there are any discrepancies or follow-up repairs needed, the
Sandia FPE makes sure that work gets done in a prioritized manner. By the time the next annual PM
occurs, all follow up actions and repairs from the previous year should be complete. Figure 33 shows
a typical PM checklist that the maintenance craft have filled out.
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Figure 33. A typical annual Sandia fire alarm ITM checklist

3.10.3 Summary

In conclusion, the fire alarm system at the Fab is very robust and is integrated into the MESA complex
system. It is also integrated into gas safety systems that the SNL 858 line organizations own. The
complexity of the system is required based on the unique hazards of an H-5 semiconductor facility. Since
the system interacts with various other SNL facility systems, it requires a high degree of maintenance
which is performed on a routine basis by SNL maintenance. The next section will discuss the sprinkler
systems in the Fab.

4 Sprinkler Systems in the Fab
4.1 General Overview

Types of Water Based Fire Suppression Systems in the facility:
1.) A wet-pipe sprinkler Riser was installed in 1987 and is in the northern part of the facility protecting
the northern half of the facility. This sprinkler will herein be called Riser 1.
2.) A wet-pipe sprinkler Riser was installed in 1987 and is located in the southern part of the facility
protecting the southern fabrication area. This sprinkler will herein be called Riser 2.
3.) A pre-action “fire cycle” Riser protects a shed type area which is part of the facility. The system is
able to cycle on and off depending on whether heat detectors serving the area are in alarm. This
sprinkler will herein be called Riser 3.
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Figure 34 shows a schematic of each Riser as originally designed. Note the varied complexity of each Riser,
especially the “central plant” Riser which is Riser #3.

Figure 34. Three Riser schematics of the Fab.

There are no standpipe systems in the facility as this is a two-story building with a basement and not a
large enough building that might require a standpipe for the Fire Department to properly fight a fire in
the facility.
Sprinkler Riser “Profiles”
Figures 35 thru 37 are sprinkler Riser “profiles” which show the location of the three Risers in 858N and
what areas of the facility they are protecting. Riser # 1 is in the north-east (NE) corner of the 1st floor and
protects the non-fabrication north side of the 1st floor along with a small portion of rooms on the 2nd floor.
Riser # 2 is in the west side of the basement and protects the basement along with the southern portion
of the 1st floor which is the semi-conductor fabrication or “fab” area. Riser # 3 is in the west side of the 1st
floor and is fed off of Riser #1 by a 4” line. It solely protects the chemical dispersing area rooms which are
located against the FAB.
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The Riser profiles also show that there are two post indicator valves (PIVs) and two fire department
connections (FDCs) for the FAB. One PIV and FDC is for Riser #1 and one FDC and PIV is for Riser #2. A
separate FDC and PIV is not needed for Riser #3 because it is fed from the same fire demand line as Riser
#1. The FDCs are double-Siamese type with 2.5” standard size outlets.

Figure 35. Riser “profile” for the 1st floor of the Fab.

Figure 36. Riser “profile” for the 2nd floor of the Fab.
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Figure 37. Riser “profile” for the basement of the Fab.

4.2 Sprinkler types

Most of the sprinkler heads in the Fab are the original ordinary temperature rated heads that were
originally installed with the facility in the late 1980s. The sprinkler heads in the clean rooms (southern
portion of the first floor) were replaced in 1999 with quick response rated ordinary temperature rated
heads. These sprinkler heads were changed out as part of a larger Sandia National Laboratories’ effort to
change out recalled Omega brand sprinkler heads. More detailed information about the sprinkler head
models was not available at the time of this report.

4.3 Design Requirements
Riser 1:

Riser 1 protects mainly lab space except for a few offices in the northern part of the facility. The offices
are classified as light hazard spaces per NFPA 13 while the rest of the space would be classified as a
Ordinary Hazard (Group II) Occupancy. Figures 38 through 40 shows an analysis of the appropriate hazard
classifications per NFPA 13 (2013 edition). Note the Riser profiles previously discussed shows which
sprinkler systems would protect which hazard areas. Riser #1 has a hydraulically most demanding design
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area of 0.2 gpm/ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 over a design area of 1500 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 per NFPA 13. (Note that the design criteria of NFPA
318 is not used because there are no clean rooms protected by Riser #1. )

Figure 38. Proposed NFPA 13 occupancy classification for the 1st floor of the Fab.

Figure 39. Proposed NFPA 13 occupancy classification for the 2nd floor of the Fab.
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Figure 40. Proposed NFPA 13 occupancy classification for the basement of the Fab.

Figure 41 below shows design densities for the various spaces protected as analyzed by a sprinkler
contractor during their analysis. Note that the values below represent the original design values of the
FAB from when it constructed in the late 1980s. Also note that the design densities differ slightly from
NFPA 13 densities because Sandia National Laboratories sprinkler densities were used.
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Figure 41. Original design densities for Riser #1 of the Fab.

Note that the original column line distinctions that the Tables are based on above was not available upon
the time this report was issued. However, it can be clearly seen that the densities were broken out
between multiple areas of the facility. The same basic densities (0.2,0.17,0.14 gpm/square foot) are used
throughout the calculations though. Again, this has more to do with Sandia lab’s sprinkler density
specifications for different room types (i.e. lab, office, mechanical code) than it has to do with different
NFPA occupancy classes.
Riser 2: Density of 0.2 gpm/ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 in accordance with NFPA 318 (PROTECTION OF SEMICONDUCTOR
FABRICATION FACILITIES) 2015 edition paragraph 11.1.4.2. over a design area of 3000𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 . Note that this
density is equivalent to an Ordinary Hazard (Group 2) facility in NFPA 13 (Figure 11.3.2.1.1) as shown in
Figure 42. The hose demand is 250 gpm over a period of 90 minutes (per NFPA 13 Table 11.2.3.1.2) for an
ordinary hazard group 2 facility. Note that 90 minutes was used for the water duration even though a
range is given in the Table (see Figure 43) because per paragraph 11.2.3.1.3 the lower durations shall be
used when the water alarm is electronically supervised in a constantly attended location.

Figure 42. NFPA 13 density/area method chart
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Figure 43. NFPA 13 Hose Demand and Water Supply Selection Table.

As discussed with Riser 1, below are more of the original design calculations. These calculations however
are all for areas sprinkler protected by Riser 2.
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Figure 44. Original design densities for Riser #2

Riser 3:
The pre-action system protects two rooms with chemical dispensing equipment. The appropriate density
requirement if 0.3 gpm/ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 square foot over the entire square footage area of the rooms since they are
less than 2500 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 (specified by Figure 44) and are the only areas protected by the Riser.

4.4 Water Supply Data
80 psi static pressure

74 psi residual pressure at 1,359 gpm
Test was performed at a hydrant located NE of building 858N.
Flow data is based on a flow test from 2005 which is not recent enough to use for actual design purposes
but will be used for this report.

4.5 Water Supply Description

The sprinkler systems in the FAB are fed from a main waterline network which runs throughout the New
Mexico Sandia labs campus and serves the rest of Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB). This waterline also
connects to the city of Albuquerque water supply at three different points. The main waterline serves
both the fire demand lines for sprinkler systems as well as the domestic water lines for plumbing
throughout both Sandia and KAFB facilities. For this reason, each fire sprinkler system on the Sandia
campus is mandated to have a backflow preventer installed to prevent cross-contamination. The FAB has
two backflow preventers installed: one on the line serving Risers #1 and #3 and one on the line serving
Riser #2.
KAFB has three main water tanks supporting fire suppression systems. The tank sizes are 500,000, and
750,000 and 500,000 gallons respectively. The Fab is in tech area I (one) of Sandia National Laboratories
which is the area of the Sandia campus which has the most developed water line system because of the
high number of facilities in the area and population of building occupants. There are numerous fire
hydrants around the Fab as shown in Figure 45. NFPA 24 paragraph 7.2.1 states that hydrants shall be
provided and spaced in accordance with the requirements of the authority having jurisdiction. SNL uses a
minimum distance of 100’ to the FDC, and other hydrants being located within 300’ of any location in the
building.
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Figure 46 shows the main water lines around the Fab. There is a 10” ductile iron line to the North of the
MESA complex from which the line for Riser #1 eventually branches off into. The 8” line for Riser #2
branches off from a 12” main located to the west of the MESA complex. Riser #3 is fed off the same 8”
fire demand line as Riser #1.

Figure 45. Fire hydrants around the 858 complex. The flow hydrant used for test data is circled.

Figure 46. Water lines (shown in blue) surrounding the Fab. Red circles indicate fire demand lines.
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4.6 System Layouts

There are two main Risers covering the FAB, Risers #1 and #2. Riser #3 only covers two small rooms
adjacent to the buildings. Figures 47 thru 49 illustrate the master sprinkler layouts throughout the Fab.
Note that a large portion of the 2nd floor is an open area with a mezzanine overlooking it.

Figure 47. Master Fire Protection Plan for the 1st floor.
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Figure 48. Master Fire Protection Plan for the 2nd floor. (Note that CAD arch file was not available.)

Figure 49. Sprinkler layout in the basement.
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Riser 1: As shown in Figure 50, Riser 1 is an 8” Riser which leads to a 4” cross main connecting to 1.5” and
2” branch lines. Riser # 1 is a gridded system on the first floor which means that the branch lines connect
back to other cross mains. A gridded system improves the hydraulic performance since the sprinkler has
two distinct paths from which to receive water from.

Figure 50. Sprinkler layout near Riser #1.

Riser 2: Riser #2 is also a gridded system. It rises from the basement and protects the fabrication area on
the 1st floor. There is a four-way seismic brace where it rises to the first floor as shown on Figure 51.

Figure 51. Piping from Riser #2 as it enters the 1st floor. Note the four-way seismic brace.
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Riser 3: Riser #3 is a 6” Riser and as previously indicated only protects two rooms (8 total sprinkler heads).
Figure 52 illustrates the location of the protected rooms and the riser, which on the sprinkler plan, is
actually only represented as a control valve.

Figure 52. Riser #3: The white circle is area of coverage and the red circle indicates the control valve.

4.7 Sprinkler Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements

NFPA 25 (2015 edition) is the governing code for fire suppression system testing requirements for this
discussion. At Sandia National Laboratories, the ITM requirements of fire protection systems has been
automated into a software program called Maximo which creates work orders for maintenance staff to
perform work in the field. These work orders are referred to as PM checklists which stand for preventative
maintenance checklists. These PMs (for short) are divided into four per year, each of which incorporates
requirements from NFPA 25. There are two quarterly PMs, a semiannual PM, and an annual PM per year.
The NFPA 25 semi-annual requirements are placed on that PM (such as verifying that a water flow signal
from the inspector’s test is received at the fire alarm control panel), the quarterly NFPA 25 requirements
on that PM (such as visual inspection of alarm devices), and the annual NFPA 25 requirements on that PM
(visual inspection of sprinkler heads).
Figure 53 shows the B858N PM checklists at SNL which includes quarterly, semi-annual, and annual
requirements (this checklist was for an annual sprinkler PM).
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Figure 53. Examples of the sprinkler ITM.

4.8 Summary and Water Supply/Demand Curve

The Fab has various sprinkler systems in the facility and some unique design features (e.g. the fire cycle
system). Figure 54 shows the water supply/demand curve for the sprinkler systems in the facility. It uses
the most hydraulically demanding design data from Figure 44 and the water supply data from Section
4.4. In this figure, the demand data is represented by the red line and the supply data is represented by
the green line. Note that even if 85% of the available water supply was used for the design (as specified
by SNL in the sprinkler design specification), the facility should have an adequate water supply.

4.9 Sprinkler System Summary

Like the fire alarm systems in the Fab, the sprinkler systems in the Fab are quite complex. There is an
extensive amount of control valves for different areas and one of the systems is a specialty Fire Cycle
system due to the hazard it protects. The systems are adequate based on the original design due to the
SNL sprinkler specification at that time. However, the recommendation would be to re-calculate the
systems to the current NFPA 13 and NFPA 30 requirement to check if the current code would be met.
Based on the hazards of the facility this check would be a good practice and could prompt re-design of
the systems as the facility itself is regularly being modified to meet mission needs. The next section
discusses the Fire Safety program of the Fab.

Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017

66

Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab)

Figure 54. Water Supply/Demand Curve

5 Fire Safety Program

5.1 Evacuation Plan Requirements

The Fab is required to have an approved fire safety and facility plan per IFC Section 403.7 since the Fab is
a Class H Occupancy. Since the Fab is a semiconductor facility (Group H-5 Occupancy), it is also required
to comply with IFC sections 403.7.1.1 through 403.7.1.4. These sections include the following
requirements:
•
•

•
•
•

Plans and diagrams shall be maintained in approved locations indicating the approximate plan for
each area.
Plans and diagrams shall indicate the amount and type of HPM stored, handled, and used,
locations of shutoff valves for supply piping, emergency telephone locations and locations of exits.
(HPM is a semiconductor facility term for Hazardous Production Materials.)
Plans and diagrams shall be maintained up to date and the fire code official and fire department
shall be informed of major changes.
Responsible persons shall be designated as on-site emergency response team and trained to be
liaison personnel for the fire department.
Emergency drills of the on-site emergency response team shall be conducted on a regular basis
but not less than once every three months. Records of drills conducted shall be maintained.
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A sample of an evacuation plan from the Fab is shown in Appendix B. Note that each floor of the Fab (First,
Second, and Basement) have an evacuation plan but only the main first floor one is shown below for
clarity.
In addition to the evacuation plans, personnel working inside the Fab are trained to know what different
colored manual pull stations do in the facility. For example, there are the normal red colored pull stations
for the fire alarm system (spaced per NFPA 72), but there are also pull stations specific to HPMS and other
hazards in a semiconductor facility. See figure 55 for descriptions of each type of pull station. (Note that
these excerpts come directly from a safety brochure distributed to the facility workforce).

Pull Stations
Fire Alarm Pull Station:
• When activated, the affected building must
evacuate. Maximum Foreseeable Loss doors
will automatically close separating 858N from
858EF.

Yellow Pull Station:
• Yellow pull stations will evacuate fab
zones in a Non-emergency manner.
These pull stations will alert the
Emergency Response Team.

Blue Pull Station:

• Blue pull stations are for personnel
who need immediate assistance in
the tour aisle. These pull stations
will alert the Emergency Response
Team.
Figure 55. Different Pull Stations in the Fab.

Sandia national labs use evacuation teams (“evac teams”) that are organized per facility or complex (a
small collection of facilities) for building occupants to leave. These teams are designed to get occupants
out of the facility in an organized manner as the fire department is traveling for fire alarm response. Each
evacuation team has a team captain who has final responsibility with making sure the team swept all their
assigned areas of the facility before evacuating.
The Fab has an even more detailed level of evacuation based on which pull station is actuated (see above).
For example, if a yellow pull station is pulled the occupants will evacuate in a more delayed manner (e.g.
securing equipment that they normally wouldn’t in an emergency). If a blue station is pulled, then
emergency responders will only go to the location where it was pulled (e.g. the tour aisle). Lots of training
and practice has gone into the Fab to make sure emergency personnel and the evacuation team performs
as appropriate during an actual building emergency. The 858 (MESA) complex also has a Mass Notification
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017

68

Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab)

System (MNS) that emergency responders can use to direct the personnel to take the appropriate action
as they direct depending on the emergency (e.g. full evacuation, shelter-in-place, etc.)

5.2 Emergency Notification

Members of Sandia’s workforce are trained to call 911 in the case of an emergency. On the Sandia
location, this number routes to Sandia’s emergency response team (ERT). The emergency response unit
accompanies the KAFB Fire Department on all fire alarms. The reason this is done is partly due to security
concerns and also due to the Sandia ERT being more familiar with some of the unique hazards in a Sandia
facility.
Sandia uses tone alert radios (TARs) to alert occupants throughout the site of emergency situations such
as an active shooter, extreme weather, etc. This system is separate from the fire alarm system but can
be used for evacuation in the same manner. The TARs may be used to give specific building occupants
instructions to shelter-in-place or to shut down hazardous operations or secure classified material. There
are multiple buildings at Sandia which do not have evacuation plans (since they do not require one per
the IFC). Therefore, having TARs enables the emergency responders or security forces to assist in the
evacuation of facility occupants in lieu of an organized evacuation plan.

5.3 Fire Fighting by Occupants

Every Sandia employee is required to take some form of basic safety training every year that tells them
what to do in the case of an emergency. Some members of the workforce (MOW) are required to take
Fire Extinguisher training if they work in a lab with an open flame, perform hot work, etc. These employees
take hands-on training on how to use a fire extinguisher but are only trained to fight a fire if they feel
comfortable doing so and if the fire is in the incipient phase. All other MOW are trained to evacuate the
building unless they feel the need to use an extinguisher for their personal safety.

5.4 Summary

The Fab is a complicated facility from a fire safety/emergency evacuation system due to it being physically
connected to three other facilities and the unique hazards from the semiconductor operations. Occupants
are specifically trained to recognize different alarms, know the difference between different colored pull
stations, listen to instructions on radios and the complex’s mass notification system, how to shut down
their current operations if need-be due to alarm, and where to evacuate the building in an organized
manner. Drills are an important part of making sure the Fab would be prepared for an emergency. The
next topic is the structural analysis of the Fab.

6 Structural Analysis
6.1 Overview

The Fab is double-tee pre-cast panel construction. The floors of the Fab are not considered fire separated
since there are multiple penetrations and gaps between the floors. As mentioned in the egress section,
this is the reason why the basement and 2nd floor are Group H-5 occupancies. The roof is a flat roof
constructed of a steel deck with insulation and a membrane covering. This arrangement is considered a
FM Type I roofing system.
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The Fab is primarily classified as an “H-5” occupancy due to it primarily being a semiconductor fabrication
facility which is defined as an H-5 occupancy under the 2015 International Building Code (IBC), paragraph
307.7. To determine what the maximum allowable building height and area are per the IBC, we can consult
Chapter 5, “General Building Heights and Areas”, and the tables contained herein. Tables 504.3 and 504.4
give the allowable building height in feet above grade plane and the allowable number of stories above
grade plane, respectively, as shown in Table 8. Also, considered into account is the type of construction
used for the Fab which is Type II-B. Values for the Fab, a sprinklered Group H-5 occupancy are circled.
Note that per the code of record, the 1985 Uniform Building Code (UBC), the type of construction is Type
II-N (“N” stood for non-rated) which was replaced in later versions of the code by the Type II-B designation.
The 858 complex has numerous barriers between the different facilities composing the complex. For
example, there exists a 4-hour maximum foreseeable loss (MFL) barrier between 858/North and 858/EF.
The MFL requirement comes from the Department of Energy (DOE) criteria and not any IBC or NFPA
requirements. The purpose of an MFL barrier is to separate the facilities in the case of a major loss due to
fire in one of the facilities such that it won’t affect the other complex facilities. For purposes of fire
protection and life safety, the entire 858 complex needs to be considered but that is beyond the scope of
this report.
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Table 8. International Building Code Criteria for Allowable Building Height and Number of Stories
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Looking at the values for the Fab, the Fab meets the prescriptive code requirements. This is because the
Fab is only 28 feet tall which is well below the 55 feet allowed in Table 504.3. Also, there are only 2 stories
above grade in the Fab which is not more than the 3 stories allowed per Table 504.4. We can now consider
the allowable area for the Fab. To start that discussion, let’s look at section 506.2.3 from the IBC below
and the subsequent equation for determining the allowable area. See figure 56 for the excerpt.
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Figure 56. Allowable Area for Building per the IBC.

Our next step is to consider 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 which we calculate from Equation 5-5 from IBC section 506.3.3 as shown
below. However, since the Fab is not adjacent to a public way as it is in a gated area, there is no 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 . See
figure 57 below for the IBC excerpt pertaining to this factor.

Figure 57. Formula for Amount of Area Increase per the IBC.

Since the actual area of the Fab includes various occupancies, we can calculate the total area of the
main three occupancy groups (B, H-5, and H-3). Since there is no part of the building that fronts a public
way, we will set 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 as zero.
𝐻𝐻 − 5: 𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 = 69,000 ∗ 2 = 138,000 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 > 64,340 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
𝐻𝐻 − 3: 𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 = 14,000 ∗ 2 = 28,000 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 > 2,788 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
𝐵𝐵: 𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 = 69,000 ∗ 2 = 138,000 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 > 65,490 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)

Therefore, as shown above all the requirements for the allowed area for the various occupancies in the
Fab are met. Table 9 shows the construction requirements for the fire ratings of various structural
elements of the building. All the requirements in the Type II-B facility are met for the Fab.
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Table 9. IBC Table 601

6.3 Summary

The Fab is compliant with the code of record’s structural analysis. It is a Type II-B constructed building
with multiple fire barriers and a double fire wall between 858/North and 858/EF. This fire wall is a

Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017

74

Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab)

Maximum Foreseeable Loss (MFL) wall per DOE requirements. The next section discusses the smoke
control analysis at the Fab.

7 Smoke Control Analysis

There is continuous operation of the fume exhaust in the facility and there are no atriums in the facility.
Additionally, a fire alarm will stop the flow of all production gases as well as shut down the HVAC systems
in the facility. Therefore, per IBC requirements, a smoke control system is not required. There is smoke
detection in the return air system for the fabrication area. Smoke and heat vents are required by IBC 415.6
when the area of a H-1,H-2, or H-3 occupancy is greater than 15,000𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 . In the Fab, the area of the H-3
chemical storage area is approximately 7,954 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 2 which is below the IBC threshold. Finally, per IBC
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 3�
415.11.1.6 mechanical exhaust ventilation not less than 1
𝑚𝑚 is required in the fabrication area where
HPMs are used or stored. This ventilation is provided in the Fab. In conclusion, all smoke control
requirements are met by the Fab. The next section discusses a performance based approach to egress, in
accordance to the SFPE Handbook, at the Fab.

8 Performance Based Approach to Egress
8.1 Occupant Characteristics

The Fab is a “24/5” facility which means it operates 24 hours a day, 5 days a week. Occupants are almost
all employees assigned to the facility. The exception are cases such as an inspector (e.g. SNL fire protection
or Facilities) or someone being given a tour of the area but in both of those examples it is required that
the person be escorted by someone who knows the layout of the facility. Additionally, SNL has a “take
your child to work” day once a year so during this day it may be possible that someone who is not that
familiar with the layout of the building might be escorting their child around the facility.
In general, the occupants/employees are assumed to be mostly able-bodied. The primary use of the
facility is for semiconductor (wafer) fabrication which generally requires persons with normal use of their
body to function intently and carefully in their operations or else the quality of the wafers and
components may not be acceptable. The offices are generally for occupants who also are active in the
facility (e.g. not managers who sit at their desk all day meaning that they would likely be able bodied as
well). Additionally, because of the low occupant rate on the second floor, which is mostly storage space,
and the fact that the basement is only occupied under a maintenance or construction function, it is
assumed that only a low percentage of occupants, less than 5%, might require assisted evacuation in the
case of fire. Requiring assisted evacuation would likely be due to some underlying health condition, caused
by the stress of an emergency, or confusion on the proper exit procedures (since the facility use is much
more complicated than a simple office building). For example, a new employee might be unsure if an
alarm is real and may wait much longer to leave a cleanroom if they are right in the middle of a delicate
manufacturing procedure with various chemicals and gases.
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8.2 Pre-Movement Time

Occupants are actively working in the facility which implies they will be highly responsive to an alarm. A
fire alarm is not the only possible alarm in the facility. In fact, users are trained to recognize the difference
between a fire alarm and various other local or building wide alarms that would trigger an evacuation. For
example, there are separate non-fire strobes for non-fire alarms with their own dedicated pull stations,
one for a local alarm, and one for a building wide evacuation. For a non-fire alarm, it is conceivable that
an occupant would need time to gather their belongings or stop the work their doing, especially in the
cleanrooms when they are working with small quantities of hazardous materials. However, for a fire alarm
the occupants are instructed to immediately evacuate regardless of whether they are working in a clean
room and are gowned. Therefore, it is expected that the pre-movement time for this facility will be
approximately two minutes for a non-fire alarm and about 10 seconds for a fire alarm. Because nonfire scenarios are beyond the scope of this report, a pre-movement time of 10 seconds will be used for
future calculations.

8.3 SFPE Hydraulic Calculation Model

Section 3, Chapter 13 of the SFPE handbook employs a hydraulic like model to estimate the evacuation
time of a building. This model essentially treats occupants as particles of water flowing. It allows an
engineer or interested party to get a rough idea about how long it would take to evacuate or “dump” a
building. It is solely dependent on the design and construction of the facility (door widths, number of exits,
exit layout etc.) and therefore its limitation is that it does not factor in human behavior such as occupants
who are not as able-bodied as others or abnormal human behavior in a panic situation (such as people
pushing each other out of the way to exit). For the purposes of this building, the model is a reasonable
approach since occupants are trained on evacuation on different alarms and are expected to behave well
in an emergency. Below are assumptions specific to this facility used for model calculations:
•

•

•

The Fab has numerous available exits to occupants. Therefore, it is not clear how to choose which
exits occupants would take. A reasonable approach taken is that there is an emergency event
requiring the entire building to evacuate. Because of how the facility is separated into a northern
business/utility section and a southern fabrication area, it is expected that people in the northern
half of the building would use the northern exits and people in the southern half would use the
southern exits. There is also a 2-hour fire barrier separating north and south so it would not make
sense for an occupant to want to cross it in the case of an emergency unless they had no choice.
The stair is in the center of the facility. Therefore, it is not expected that merging flows (2nd floor
occupants traveling down and 1st floor occupants traveling up) would occur. The SFPE handbook
has a specific equation for merging flows (equation 6 of Section 3, Chapter 13) but that is for cases
where the exit discharges near the exterior of a facility and it possible to have people coming
down from the upper floors while first floor occupants are exiting the building.
All exit doors have a nominal width of 44”. A walkthrough of the facility where a select sampling
of doors was measured as 44” wide is the basis of this assumption.

While many possible exit scenarios exist in a building with as many exits and complex operations like the
Fab, one reasonable one was picked for the analysis. The situation is as follows:
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An emergency requires the building to evacuate. The fabrication area is at its maximum occupant
load. Half of the occupants of the southern part of the facility (recall it’s separated from the
northern part by a 2-hour fire barrier) exit through the 4 emergency exits shown in Figure 58. The
locations of these exits on a floor plan are shown below. The 4 doors at the bottom of the clouded
area are the 4 emergency exits.
Any occupants exiting the facility from the second floor will use the exits in the corridor on the
other side of the North/South 2- hour fire barrier.

Figure 58. Location of where half of the fab area occupants are assumed to be during calculation

Since half of the occupants of the industrial general use are exiting that means the number of occupants
is as follows:
317 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
= 158.5 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 159 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
2
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It is anticipated that queuing will occur. Therefore, the maximum specific flow value of a door in Table 313.5 will be used in Equation 8 of SFPE Section 3, Chapter 13. A boundary layer of 6” on both interior sides
of the emergency exit (as shown in SFPE Figure 3-13.6) will be used.
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 4(44𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) �

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
1 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
� �24
� = 256
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒
12 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

It is assumed of the 159 occupants in the area marked on Figure 58, a quarter would go to each of the
doors (evenly distribute themselves). Therefore, for one door in the area, the evacuation time would be
𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =

0.25 ∗ 159 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
= 0.15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∗ 60 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 9 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
�𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
256

When the pre-movement time is added to this value, the time to evacuation becomes approximately 20
seconds. Overall this low evacuation time can be expected because of the numerous emergency exits that
the facility has. The governing time to evacuate will be the pre-movement time in the fabrication area
when occupants must safely stop work, asses what type of alarm they hear and what the appropriate
response is, and then begin to move.

8.4 General Tenability Conditions

While the occupants of the building in the fabrication area are using hazardous chemicals in their work,
the amount is minimal and the materials are mostly confined to the clean room “tools”. NFPA 318 gives
an excellent discussion of this in their annex section. Because of the closely regulated use of hazardous
materials, it is not expected that those materials would cause an additional hazard to the tenability of the
facility. There is also a 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2 (carbon dioxide) suppression system in each clean room tool which helps to
mitigate concerns from occupants being exposed directly to the hazardous materials in their tool. Each
cleanroom even has a pull station that occupants could pull to activate their local 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2 discharge. The
cleanroom doors always open from the inside as well which would alleviate concerns from occupants
being trapped in a confined space with an excess of 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2 .

Smoke is the largest concern for the facility since smoke has an effect not only on an occupant’s vision
and respiratory health but also their speed to evacuate in an emergency. The SFPE handbook has excellent
data showing the dramatic affect that even a small amount of smoke has on walking speed. Tenability
thresholds of 120 degrees Celsius temperature and a heat flux of 2.5 kW/m have also been established
for able-bodied persons through research into this field. For smoke obscuration, a requirement to see
though smoke at 30 meters is typically used. All these performance factors could be used for a
performance based approach to the Fab. An advantage of the layout of the Fab to a performance based
design is that because of the numerous exits of the facility, reaching untenable levels for an occupant
would be difficult. Tenability is discussed further in the fire modeling section of this report.

8.5 Pathfinder Model

An evacuation model was made for the first floor Fab using the Pathfinder software which is made by
Thunderhead Engineering. It is assumed that the first floor will be most critical when it comes to egress
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since the second floor is essentially an interstitial area and the basement is usually scarcely occupied and
is mostly space for equipment supporting the functions of the facility. The model as shown in Figure 59
was created by tracing a footprint of the first floor and rooms in the program and then also adding doors
(shown in green and orange) based on the floor plans.

See
Figure
60

Figure 59. Pathfinder model of the first floor of the Fab.

The occupant load per the LSC was used to approximately place the occupants. Some of these rooms are
not expected to have nearly as many people during actual use. For example, the mechanical room is a
very large area in the northeast area of the floor but it is usually scarcely occupied only by workers
performing maintenance. In the Pathfinder model, however it had a lot of people in it per the allowable
occupant load. In the model, there was a clear bottle neck at the northeast exit from the tour aisle
(fabrication area) as shown in Figure 60. Note that the chemical storage area directly north to where the
occupants were exited had its doors removed in the model because those doors are access controlled
only and few occupants have the key to it. Additionally, the area is considered more hazardous than the
tour aisle so per the IBC, occupants should not be counted on to exit through there.
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Figure 60. Bottleneck near the chemical storage room. The lines indicate paths of travel.

Overall, the exit time of the model was approximately 79 seconds as shown in Figure 61. Together with
the 10 second pre-movement time, the overall required egress time would be approximately 90 seconds
or a minute and a half.
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Figure 61. Pathfinder Exit Graph (Occupants Exiting The First Floor of the Fab)

8.6 Summary

In conclusion, both the SFPE hydraulic model and the Thunderhead Engineering Pathfinder model was
used to analyze the egress capabilities of the Fab. Heavy queuing was observed near the chemical storage
room. However, the overall egress time was a minute and a half even with the pre-movement time added.
The next section will address a performance based fire modeling analysis in accordance with the Life
Safety Code.

9 Performance Based Fire Modeling
9.1 Performance Based Approach

NFPA 101, the Life Safety Code (LSC), gives 8 design fire scenarios to use for a performance based
approach to fire protection, opposed to the prescriptive based requirements given in the rest of the code.
LSC paragraph 5.2.2 states that each design fire shall be realistic to at least one of the following scenario
specifications: initial fire location, early rate of growth in fire severity, and smoke generation. For the fire
modeling chosen in the report, the initial fire location was selected as the main specification but every
reasonable effort was also made to capture the early rate of growth of the fire and smoke generation
through the model parameters and the research conduction on which heat release rate (HRR) to use.
LSC fire scenario 2 was chosen for the modeling case. This scenario describes an ultra-fast developing fire
in the primary means of egress with interior doors open at the start of the fire. This scenario is also
supposed to address concern of a reduction in the available means of egress. While all characteristics
were not able to be met for the chosen scenario (the fire modeled was a medium growth fire), it did
address the concern of a reduction in the available means of egress. Furthermore, the scenario was used
to explore how fast the tenable conditions deteriorated in a means of egress.
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For the performance based scenario, tenability conditions were chosen for a means of egress. Section 8.4
addressed general tenability conditions for this facility but for the fire scenario people in the egress path
were considered and the criteria considered was more conservative. Table 10 shows the chosen tenability
criteria which arose from two sources: The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook, and the
Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering (HSCE).

Table 10. Tenability Criteria for Performance Based Fire Modeling
Tenability Criterion
Temperature
Carbon Monoxide (CO) Production
Visibility through Smoke Produced

Threshold for pass/fail
< 66℃ to pass
< 1,400 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 to pass
> 4 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 to pass

Literature Source of Criterion
HSCE Figure 6.1
HSCE
SFPE Table 61.3 (familiar occupants)

For visibility, the criterion for familiar occupants was used because, as stated previously, the Fab is a
control access facility and occupants need specialized training to work there unescorted. If they don’t
have the access they must have an escort who is familiar with the layout of the facility and exit locations.
66℃ was chosen as the tenability criteria for temperature because in dry air that temperature should be
tolerable per experimental research. That means that a person should be able to adequately move and
egress quickly away from the heat and smoke of the modeled fire.

9.2 Fire Scenario

There is a concern with lab coat gowning attire currently in the tour aisle of the fab area. Figure 62 shows
the lab coats in this area. This arrangement is considered temporary until a new gowning area is
constructed which is planned for the near future. However, this current configuration presents a fire
hazard for one of the main paths to the exits of the facility. Note that there are two locations in this area
where gowning attire is present. The attire includes lab coats which are mostly polyester and plastic bins
with lab shoe covers, gloves, and hairnets.

Figure 62. Gowning attire in the tour aisle (corridor) of the Fab.
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The main fire scenario selected for this building is that one of the lab coat locations catches on fire due to
a contractor’s hand-held power tool malfunctioning and serving as an ignition source. This is plausible as
there is a lot of ongoing construction as part of the SSiFR project (see egress section) and a contractor
could be checking their tool as they are preparing to gown themselves. Additionally, 55 gallon drums of
materials (HF acid) is routinely moved through the corridor which presents an additional hazard. Figure
63 shows a possible fire location and the path of the acid as it travels through the facility.

Figure 63. Fire scenario and the path of the acid being moved through the corridor.

9.3 Fire Model

To model this scenario, the PyroSim software (by Thunderhead engineering) was used. An existing CAD
layout of the building was used to model the building in PyroSim. Figure 64 shows the model. Every room
was modeled of the facility except a small portion to the right which was not included because the CAD
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file didn’t originally include it as historically this portion of the building had been considered a part of the
other fab in the MESA complex which is 858/EF. The actual height of the first floor was measured so that
it could be placed in the model as the height of the walls.

Figure 64. PyroSim model of the Fab’s first floor

The corridor of the facility was modeled for a fire. There are six sprinkler heads in the short corridor shown
in Figure 65. It is assumed that the doors are closed during the fire which is the normal operational
procedure. A fire in this area would impact the egress in that corner of that building as occupants located
to the west and to the south would have to find another means of egress and would be exposed to the
toxic gases from smoke if they were to open the doors (either to the west or the south).
To better understand the role of sprinklers in the corridor during the fire, two scenarios were run. One
scenario was with sprinklers and one was without. It was anticipated from the nature of sprinkler
protection that tenability criteria would improve with the presence of sprinklers. However more precise
data was desired and specifically whether some tenability criterion would pass with sprinklers but not
without them.
As previously stated in this report, there is a large degree of construction work occurring in the Fab and
there is a potential concern that during construction (like that shown in Figure 66), the sprinkler system
would be impaired unintentionally while hot work was occurring. Note that SNL does have a policy against
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hot work occurring while a sprinkler system is impaired. However, for the sake of analyzing a plausible
“worst-case scenario” the no-sprinklers situation was included in the modeling efforts.

Figure 65. PyroSim model of the fire in the corridor of the facility.

Figure 66. Construction activities occurring in the Fab near location of the fire scenario.
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Research was conducted to find an adequate heat release rate (HRR) of a lab coat rack like that shown in
Figure 67. The closest approximation found was from a report entitled, “Characterizing of Design Fires for
Clothing Stores” by Zalok and Hadjisphocleous (Zalok & Hadjisophocleous, 2007). These researchers
tested several fuel packages made to simulate those found at a typical clothing store. They included
pictures of their test configurations as well as measured HRR curves. Their experiment for shirts on a coat
rack was used as the basis of the design fire. Figures 67 and 68 shows both the test configuration and the
HRR curve respectively. The authors noted that the HRR curve resembles a medium T-squared fire curve.

Figure 67. Fuel package that was used for testing in Zalok & Hadjisphocleous paper
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Figure 68. Test data from paper. “Test C” is the cloth test shown in figure 64.

To model the actual effect of a sprinkler on a fire, the model with sprinklers was run first and then the
HRR was capped at the time of the first sprinkler activation (noted at 188 seconds). This HRR curve is
shown in Figure 69. It was observed from multiple model runs that if this was not done, then the presence
of sprinklers was purely cosmetic as it didn’t have any actual effect on the fire. Note that a curve
resembling “Test C” in Figure 68 was used for the non-sprinkler model run.
Note that Figure 65 shows a three-dimensional fire since it can clearly be seen from Figure 67 that a lab
coat fire would emit heat from all dimensions and not from one dimension as a typical PyroSim burner
would do. The surface area of all the sides of the block shown in Figure 65 were used to accurately
compute the total HRR of the model runs which was approximately 550 kW for the sprinkler run and
approximately 1400 kW for the non-sprinklered run.
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Figure 69. HRR of the burning coat rack with sprinklers controlling the fire

9.4 Modeling Results

Table 11 shows the sprinkler activation times for the model run involving sprinklers. The location of the
sprinklers (1-6) were given previously in Figure 65. As one would expect, the sprinklers located closer to
the fire were the first ones to activate.
Table 11. Sprinkler Activation Times
Sprinkler ID in Fire Model
SPRK05
SPRK06
SPRK04
SPRK03
SPRK02
SPRK01

Activation Time (Seconds)
187.6
189.2
208.4
224.3
237.8
263.7

Figures 70 through 72 show the results of the non-sprinklered corridor model run for the tenability criteria
previously described: temperature, CO production, and visibility at the walking surface level of 6 feet.
Figures 73 through 75 show the same results for the sprinklered corridor model run.
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Figure 70. Temperature Slice File for Non-Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface.
(Note that Temperature@ 360 seconds ≈ 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐℃ >> 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟔℃)

Figure 71. CO Production Slice File for Non-Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface.
(Note that CO production= 10,000 ppm@ 501 seconds >> 𝟏𝟏, 𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑)
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Figure 72. Visibility Slice File for Non-Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface.
(Note that Visibility ≈ 𝟎𝟎 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 @ 114 seconds at 6 feet walking surface)

Figure 73. Temperature Slice File for Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface.
(Note that Temperature@ 294 seconds ≈ 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏℃ >> 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟔℃)
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Figure 74. CO Production Slice File for Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface.
(Note that CO production= 1,500 ppm@ 523 seconds >> 𝟏𝟏, 𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑)

Figure 75. Visibility Slice File for Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface.
(Note that Visibility ≈ 𝟎𝟎 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 @ 125 seconds at 6 feet walking surface)
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Table 12 shows a summary of the fire model results. Because of the size of the fire and the small corridor
length, all the criteria fail miserably (except for CO production for scenario 2). The closest that either
model run comes to passing the tenability criteria is the CO production for the sprinklered case which was
1,500 ppm and very close to the 1,400 ppm threshold established. Since the doors of the corridor are
typically closed, it is safe to assume that a lab coat fire would quickly overwhelm the integrity of egress of
the corridor and essentially shut off the main exit for the north east portion of the fabrication area.
Table 12. Tenability Criteria Results from Fire Models
Tenability Criteria (at 6 ft.)
Temperature under 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟔℃

CO Production under
𝟏𝟏, 𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑
Visibility greater than 4 meters

Scenario 1 (Without Sprinklers)
270℃
10,000 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑

Scenario 2 (With Sprinklers)
170℃
1,500 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑

0 meters

0 meters

Perhaps even more alarming than the tenability criteria failing is how fast the smoke layer descends in the
corridor. Figure 76 shows a graph of the smoke layer height vs. time for the sprinkler case model run. It
can be clearly seen that the smoke layer descends to 1.8 meters (6 ft.) in less than two minutes (90
seconds). Six feet as previously noted is considered the walking level. Therefore, the smoke starts to
impair visibility in a corridor very quickly even for the best case where sprinklers activate. The effect of
smoke on visibility is even more striking when looking in the corridor during the model run as Figures 7780 show. These figures were created by using the “viewpoint” feature in PyroSim/SmokeView. Note that
the green ball in the model is the layer device used to produce the smoke height curve from Figure 76.
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Figure 76. Smoke Layer Height Descent Curve
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Figure 77. 0 seconds into fire simulation with sprinklers.

Figure 78. 50 seconds into fire simulation with sprinklers. Note slight smoke.
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Figure 79. 60 seconds into fire simulation with sprinklers. Note heavy smoke.

Figure 80. 105 seconds into fire simulation with sprinklers. Note zero visibility.

Results from Chapter 8 and the Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) as determined show an RSET of 90
seconds. The ASET was approximated as 70 seconds. Therefore, the visibility decreases below the
tenability criteria in an Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) less than the RSET. This can clearly be seen in
figures 77-80 from an occupant’s point of view if they were in the corridor when the fire occurred.
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 80 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 10 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 90 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

Where 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓)

𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 4.2.1
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(Note that this value was taken for a mid-rise office building since no data exited for a facility like the Fab.
It’s expected that the delay in egress of an office building would be like that of a Fab. As mentioned
previously, occupants are trained to immediately start exiting the Fab upon notification of a fire alarm.)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ~ 70 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 < 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 90 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∴ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂!

10 Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, the Fab is a very complicated and intricate facility which was designed and built specifically
for semiconductor operations. It incorporates best practices and specialty code requirements (such as
from NFPA 318) that aren’t seen in a typical industrial lab facility. It is also a part of a complex which
consists of four main facilities and various small support rooms/buildings such as a warehouse and utility
building. Being part of a complex primarily effects the egress and fire alarm systems in the Fab. With
respect to the fire alarm system, the Fab has its own building fire alarm system which is then tied into a
complex wide system. With concerns to egress, there are various fire barriers and fire walls connecting
the different facilities. The most robust of them is a double fire wall between 858/North and 858/EF (the
two manufacturing portions of the complex).
Fire Safety in the Fab is heavily incorporated into other facilities and operational systems. For example,
each clean room tool has carbon dioxide fire suppression built into it. There are also the various alarms
throughout the facility besides only fire alarm. For example, there are toxic gas alarms and general alert
signals that can be triggered by safety personnel and building occupants.
Wet pipe fire suppression is the main source of fire protection in the facility. There are three wet pipe
risers in the building. Also provided is carbon dioxide protection of the clean room tools. All systems are
regularly maintained per code by either Sandia Labs maintenance or an outside contractor. High sensitivity
smoke detection is provided in some areas and maintained by an outside contractor.
Table 13 shows the main conclusions and recommendations of this report. The most pressing issue of the
gowning equipment in the corridor. At the close of this report, construction of the gowning area is
complete and this fire scenario will be eliminated once all gowns are moved from the corridor into its new
dedicated space. This move is expected to take place in the near (short) timeframe as of the time of this
report.
Moving acids and other chemicals is an issue that is currently being discussed for the facility. The problem
is that the building was built to the 1985 UBC which didn’t have the same restrictions on moving chemicals
as what’s in NFPA 318 today. Additionally, the facility was originally constructed as an H-6 space (now
called H-5 by the IBC) with the sole exception of the chemical storage area which was considered an H-2
space. More work will have to be done to lower the risk of HPMs affecting egress beyond reason.
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Table 13. Recommendation Table Based on Report Analysis

Recommendation
Add an exit to the exterior to RM 1919

Reason
RM 1919 falls under the high hazard provisions of
NFPA 101 and doesn’t meet NFPA requirements
for NFPA high hazard content requirements
Perform new flow test.
NFPA mandates that flow test must be within 5
years of any design initiated for the sprinkler
system. Current flow test data is too old.
Reconstitute hydraulic calculations
Original hydraulic calculations are not available
and design densities don’t match current NFPA
sprinkler criteria for flammable liquid storage
(NFPA 30) or a semiconductor facility (NFPA 318)
Move gowning operations from the corridors to Fire modeling shows that a lab coat fire in the
a dedicated space
corridor will severely affect the ability of that area
to serve as an egress path.
Minimize the movement of acid through an An acid spill would hinder egress through the
egress corridor during the times the building is corridor. It would also hamper emergency
normally occupied.
response if there was a fire occurring at the same
time.
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Appendix A. Egress Related Analysis
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Figure 81. A-1. Fire Rated separations on the first floor.
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Figure 82. A-2. Fire Rated separations on the second floor.
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Figure 83. A-3. Fire Rated separations in the basement.
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Color Code

Occupancy Class

Total Number of Occupants

Green

Group B

39

Pink

Group S-1

13

Orange

Group H-3

49

Blue

Group H-5

238

Total Number of Occupants on the floor. :

339

Figure 84. A-4. Occupancy Group Classification for the First Floor.
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Color Code

Occupancy

Total Occupants

Blue

Group H-5

18

Figure 85. A-5. Occupancy Group Classification for the Second Floor.
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Color Code

Occupancy

Total Occupants

Blue

Group H-5

329

Figure 86. A-6. Occupancy Group Classification for the Basement.
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Table 14. A-1. Occupant Load Calculations for the First Floor

Room
Number

Room Name

Square
Footage

Occupancy Use

1505

Metrology
Chase
Metology Bay

262.1

Photlith 3/4
Chase
Photolith 3 Bay

384.4

Photolith 2/3
Chase
Photlith 2 Bay

337.8

Photlith 1/2
Chase
Photlith 1 Bay

470.8

Photlith 1
Chase
Etch 6 Bay

338.7

Ion Implant
Chase
MEMS
Etch/Endura 3
Chase
Metrology/Etch
7 Chase
Etch 7 Bay

1134.4

H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process

Etch 7/E.A. 1
Chase
Eng. Ana. 1 Bay

494.2

Lot Start - P
Test Chase
Inspection Bay

244.4

HDP/CVD
Chase
CVD/Metals
Bay

448

1506
1507
1508
1509
1510
1511
1512
1513
1514
1603
1604
1605
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612

563.8

454.6

526.7

401.1

315.9

1210.8
434.9
202.2

449.9

449.7

232.5
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H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process

Occupancy
Load Factor
(ft^2/occupant)
200

Occupant
Load
(Fractional)
1.31

Occupant
Load
(People)
2

200

2.82

4

200

1.92

3

200

2.27

3

200

1.69

3

200

2.63

4

200

2.35

3

200

2.01

3

200

1.69

3

200

1.58

3

200

5.67

7

200

6.05

7

200

2.17

3

200

1.01

2

200

2.47

3

200

2.25

3

200

1.22

2

200

2.25

3

200

2.24

3

200

1.16

2
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Metalization 2
Chase

535.2
160.8

1615

246.5

1616

1059.3

1616A

67.3

1617
1618

Restroom

1621
1700

844.8
67.2
855.8

Service

1701

2584.2
306

1702

Diffusion 2 Bay

307.6

1703

Diffusion 1/2
Chase
Diffusion 1 Bay

562

1704
1705

341.6

Etch 3 EA 2
Chase
EA 2 Diff 1 Bay

379.6

287.9

1708

Engineering
Analysis 2
Etch 3 Bay

1709

Etch 2/3 Chase

405

1710

Etch 2 Bay

386.4

1711

Etch 1/2 Chase

244.4

1712

Etch 1 Bay

395.2

1713

Photo 5 Chase

298.3

1714

CMP1 Bay

261.4

1715

CMP Chase

2085.4

1706
1707

348.4

332
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H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
Business Areas
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process

200

2.68

4

200

0.80

2

200

1.23

2

200

5.30

6

200

0.34

1

100
200

8.45
0.34

9
1

200

4.28

5

200

12.92

14

200

1.53

3

200

1.54

3

200

2.81

4

200

1.71

3

200

1.90

3

200

1.74

3

200

1.44

2

200

1.66

3

200

2.03

3

200

1.93

3

200

1.22

2

200

1.98

3

200

1.49

2

200

1.31

2

200

10.43

11
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145.9
187.4

1802

Diffusion 2 CVD
1 Chase
CVD 1

1803

CVD 1/2 Chase

242.6

1804

CVD Bay

283.5

1805

144.8

1806

CVD Flex 1
Chase
Etch 4 Bay

1807

Etch 4 Chase

459.9

1808

Chemical Passthru

136.5

1809

Etch 5 Chase

468

1810

Etch 5 Bay

639.5

1811

Etch
5/Metalization
1 Chase
Metalilzation 1
Bay
Metalilzation 1
Chase

585.5

1808A

1812
1813
1814

331.6

403.2

179.8

276.6
640
238.1

1815

245.6

1815A

145.3

1817

730.3

1819

827.6

1821

1307.2

1902

977.3

1904

299.5

Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017

H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process

200

0.73

2

200

0.94

2

200

1.66

3

200

1.21

2

200

1.42

2

200

0.72

2

200

2.02

3

200

2.30

3

200

0.68

2

200

0.90

2

200

2.34

3

200

3.20

4

200

2.93

4

H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process

200

1.38

2

200

3.20

4

200

1.19

2

200

1.23

2

200

0.73

2

200

3.65

5

200

4.14

5

200

6.54

8

200

4.89

6

200

1.50

2
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158

1905A
1906
1906-A
1906-B
1906-C
1906-D
1910
1914
1919
1920
1922
1926
1928A
1928B
1930-A
1930-B
1930-C
1930-D
1931
1931-A
1931-B
1931-C
1932

141.2
Loading Dock

Material
Control

1187.1
66
66
66
63
665.4
726.2

Exhaust Fan
Room
DI Water Room

1436.1

Mechanical
Room

11373

u88

4109.4

446.4
189.3
189.3
129.3
129.3
139.6
139.6
164.4
123.2
123.2
87.9
339.1

1946

Acid Storage

417.5

1950

Alkali Storage

484.5

1954

Hirsch Room

317.7

1958

Flammable
Storage
Chemical
Storage
Sodium
Hydroxide

431.2

1964
1980

933
250
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H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-5 Manuf &
Process
S-1 Storage
S-1 Storage
S-1 Storage
S-1 Storage
S-1 Storage
S-1 Storage

200

0.79

2

200

0.71

2

300
300
300
300
300
300

3.96
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.21
2.22

5
1
1
1
1
3

H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-3 Hazardous
Storage
H-3 Hazardous
Storage
Group U

200

3.63

5

200

7.18

8

200

20.55

22

300

37.91

39

Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
Business Areas
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-3 Hazardous
Storage
H-3 Hazardous
Storage
H-5 Manuf &
Process
H-3 Hazardous
Storage
H-3 Hazardous
Storage
H-3 Hazardous
Storage

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
200

4.46
1.89
1.89
1.29
1.29
1.40
1.40
1.64
1.23
1.23
0.88
1.70

5
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
3

200

2.09

3

200

2.42

3

200

1.59

3

200

2.16

3

200

4.67

6

200

1.25

2

108

1981

Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab)

Sulfuric Acid

250

Total Square
Footage:

57694.7

H-3 Hazardous
Storage

200

1.25

2

Total
Occupant
Load:

374

Occupant Load Calculations for the Second Floor:

Room
Descriptio
n
General
Storage
General
Storage
General
Storage
General
Storage
Shop
General
Lab

Room
Number
200

Square
Footage

Occupancy

Occupancy Load
Factor
(ft^2/occupant)
200

Occupant
Load
(Fractional)

Occupant
Load
(People)

472

H-5 Manuf & Process

201

548

H-5 Manuf & Process

200

2.74

4

202

346

H-5 Manuf & Process

500

1.73

3

203

582

H-5 Manuf & Process

200

2.91

4

204

197

200

205

344

H-5 Manuf & Process
H-5 Manuf & Process

0.985
1.72

2
3

Total
Occupied
Area (2nd
floor):

2489

Total
Occupant
Load (2nd
Floor):

19
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200

2.36

3
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Figure 87. A-7. Exit Sign Markings (Proposed if design needs to be reconstituted.)
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Figure 88. A-8. Exits provided for the facility. Green circles represent exits to the exterior and blue circles indicate exits to the
other facilities in the MESA complex.
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Appendix B. Sample Evacuation Plan
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Figure 89. B-1. Fab Basement Emergency Equipment and Evacuation Plan
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Figure 90. B-2. Safety and Warning Equipment in Fabrication Area.
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